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العنوان
Two essays on stock market liquidity /
المؤلف
Mekhaimer, Mohamed A.
هيئة الاعداد
باحث / محمد مخيمر
مشرف / توماس مكلنيش
مشرف / كرستين جيانج
مشرف / مارك سودرمان
الموضوع
Stock exchanges. Management information systems. Business. Management - Data processing.
تاريخ النشر
2014.
عدد الصفحات
150 p. ;
اللغة
الإنجليزية
الدرجة
الدكتوراه
التخصص
الأعمال والإدارة والمحاسبة (المتنوعة)
تاريخ الإجازة
1/1/2014
مكان الإجازة
جامعة المنصورة - كلية التجارة - Business administration
الفهرس
Only 14 pages are availabe for public view

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Abstract

Mekhaimer, Mohamed A. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August 2014. Two Essays on Stock Market Liquidity. Co-Major Professors: christine Jiang, Ph.D. and Sandra Mortal, Ph.D.
This dissertation is composed of two essays. In the first essay, we use the introduction of the first transatlantic trading platform NYSE Arca Europe (NAE), as an exogenous shock to examine the impact of market design on commonality in liquidity. We find that commonality in liquidity increases significantly for stocks traded in the NAE, specifically, the introduction of the transatlantic NAE trading platform increases the co-movement of NAE stocks with NAE aggregate liquidity while their co-movement with the home market aggregate liquidity decreases. Further, we find that the commonality in liquidity remains unchanged for matched non-NAE control sample stocks. Our results are robust to different methods for computing commonality, different liquidity proxies and across size quintiles. We conclude that market design and trading infrastructure has a significant impact on commonality in liquidity.
The second essay investigates the impact of internal governance on stock market liquidity. Acharya, Myers and Rajan (2011) develop a model of internal governance where subordinate managers can effectively monitor the CEO to maintain the future of the firm. Using a measure of internal governance based on the difference in horizons between a CEO and his subordinates, we show that firms with better internal governance have lower information asymmetry and higher liquidity. We also show that internal governance is more effective in enhancing liquidity for firms with CEOs close to retirement, firms that require higher firm-specific skills, and firms with experienced subordinate managers. Our results are robust to inclusion of conventional governance measures, alternative model specifications, and different measures of internal governance and liquidity.