الفهرس 
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Abstract
This study has three main objectives. First, to examine the consequences of mandatory adoption of IFRS on conditional conservatism in the United Kingdom. Second, to examine the effect of board of directors‟ independence on conditional conservatism. Third, the above two objectives are directed toward general objective which is examining the interaction between IFRS and corporate governance, proxied by board of directors‟ independence, concerning conditional conservatism to reduce information asymmetries and mitigate agency conflict. A sample from UK non-financial firms listed within the FTSE100 index over a period of six years from 2002 to 2007, and two measures of conditional conservatism, Givoly and Hayn (2000) accrual-based measure and, Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness measure are used. Board size, CEO/chairman role, percentage of independent directors, and percentage of executive directors are used as proxies for board of directors‟ independence. The empirical findings show that there is a decrease in conditional conservatism after a period of mandatory adoption of IFRS, and there is a positive relationship between board of directors‟ independence and conditional conservatism. Moreover, IFRS and board of directors‟ independence have a complementary impact on conditional conservatism, whilst corporate governance proxied by board of director‟s independence increases the effectiveness of IFRS adoption concerning conditional conservatism. These results hold after controlling for firm‟s growth rate in sales, leverage, profitability, auditor type, and litigation risk. The results have an important implication for companies adopting IFRS to have good corporate governance mechanisms in order to be able to reduce information asymmetries to mitigate agency and contracting conflicts.