الفهرس 
AbstractOnly 14 pages are availabe for public view
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Abstract
Purpose- The research investigates whether banks are motivated to manage earnings through securitization gains when earnings before securitization are low or when there are more negative changes in earnings before securitization under SFAS 140. The research also examines if earnings management incentives are eliminated after the adoption of SFAS 166. Moreover, the study examines if managers use discretion afforded by fair value accounting rules to manage securitization gains under SFAS 140.
Design/ Methodology- A sample of U.S. Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) listed on the New York stock exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ are selected which cover two time periods: Pre-SFAS 166 (2007-2009) and Post-SFAS 166 (2010-2016). A Panel Data Analysis is utilized to examine securitization transactions in these two time periods.
Findings- The results of the study provide evidence of earnings management when securitization transactions are conducted in accordance with SFAS 140 rules. Furthermore, the research finds that bank managers use their discretion over fair value accounting measurements to manage securitization gains in the Pre-SFAS 166 period. However, there is no evidence of earnings management under SFAS 166 rules suggesting that companies have become more conservative after the adoption of FAS 166.
Research Limitation/ Implication- The research covers a sample of U.S banking sector which may limit the generality of the empirical results to other industries and countries. Also, the number of years covered in the study are from year 2007 till 2016.
Key Words: Securitization, Fair Value Accounting, Earnings Management, SFAS 140/166.